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Cultural relativism is an integral part of the field 
methodology for cultural anthropologists. The concept of 
cultural relativism grew from developments within the 
philosophy of language, particularly associated with figures 
such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Whorf, and Sapir.  These 
philosophers all argue for some version of the concept that 
linguistic categories, encoded in thought, help create the 
shared cultural realities in which we live. This concept of 
linguistic relativism, famously articulated in the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis1, led to an emphasis in anthropology on 
the emic, or insider’s, perspective. Ethnography is the 
process of eliciting the meanings by which the host culture 
constructs reality and translating these into the discourse of 
the discipline in a final written product. Steven Pinker, along 
with other evolutionary psychologists and cognitive 
scientists, refers to any and all versions of this view as the 
Standard Social Science Model2 allowing him to defeat 
cultural relativism in one fell swoop (or so he thinks). Until 
a few years ago, the main critique of the ethnographic 
method came from the postmodern critique of science,  
                                                
1 Benjamin Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” Technology Review, 42 
(1940): 247-248. 
2 Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York: W. Morrow and 
Co., 1994), 23. 
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which questions objectivity in the social sciences on both 
ethical and epistemological grounds. Recently, the critique  
of cultural relativism has come from evolutionary 
psychologists and anthropologists. Research in cognitive 
science and psychology points to an evolutionary cause for 
what has previously been deemed cultural behavior. Some, 
including Steven Pinker, believe that this research should 
lead us to give primacy to evolutionary causes and should 
undermine any version of cultural relativism. 
 Steven Pinker, an evolutionary psychologist, presents 
an important challenge to the relativist views of language 
and meaning that pervade cultural anthropology. Advances 
in evolutionary psychology and the mind sciences provide 
evidence for biological commonalities in humans that extend 
to commonalities in our linguistic abilities and thought 
processes. Pinker argues that language is different from 
other aspects of so-called cultural behavior because it is 
innate or instinctual. Children become advanced 
grammarians without formal instruction, demonstrating an 
ability to apply rules beyond their ability to articulate such 
rules. This happens universally in the same way, as Pinker 
puts it, that children learn to walk upright instead of crawl 
around on all fours.3 
 Pinker argues that the universality of language 
entails universality in cognition. “People do not think in 
English or Chinese or Apache,” he says; “they think in a 
language of thought.”4 This language, which Pinker calls 
mentalese, may resemble all of these languages but it is 
probably richer than some and simpler than others.5 If 
cognition is shaped by a language of thought, then it is a  
                                                
3 Ibid, 18. 
4 Ibid, 81. 
5 Ibid, 81. 
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biological property of all human beings, much the same as 
walking upright. Pinker is positing a language that is held  
prior to learned languages by all human beings and it is this 
innate language that shapes our cognition. If cognition is 
shaped not by the languages we know but by a universal 
language of thought, then relativism is undermined and this 
could have serious implications for anthropological theory 
and methodology. 
 Does the universality of language seriously 
undermine the Standard Social Science Model as Pinker 
claims? I argue that the evolutionary view of cognition is not 
necessarily incompatible with relativist views of meaning 
and values. Rather than take the Standard Social Science 
Model as one theory, as Pinker does, I will focus on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and culture. 
Wittgenstein’s position represents a more nuanced relativism 
that can account for aspects of Pinker’s language instinct 
while still arguing for some degree of cultural relativism. In 
the first section, I discuss the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as a 
basis for cultural relativism before outlining the challenges 
that Pinker presents to relativism and cultural anthropology. 
I will then discuss Wittgenstein’s involvment in 
anthropology through the works of Stanley Cavell and 
anthropologist Veena Das and attempt a Wittgensteinian 




 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the basis for linguistic 
relativism as it is used in anthropology. Linguistic relativism 
has many different meanings and levels of interpretation. To 
understand this, I will return to the primary source that best 
sums up the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Benjamin Whorf’s  
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article “Science and Linguistics” examines the way that 
language affects thought and how the structure of language  
affects cognition. Whorf is critical of natural logic, which 
states that language depends on laws of reason and logic that 
are the same for everyone and exist independently of us.6 
This implies that any language can express the same 
thought, because all languages are essentially extensions of 
reasoning and logic7. Whorf proposes that, rather than 
describe universal systems of reasoning, language actually 
creates these systems and, in doing so, actually shapes our 
experience of the world. 
 Whorf begins with a thought experiment in which we 
imagine a world of people who only had the psychological 
ability to see the color blue.8 Since they have never seen any 
other color, the concept of different colors to these people 
would be meaningless. The only way for the category of 
color to have any meaning for them would be if they had 
“exceptional moments”9 of seeing other colors. This thought 
experiment show the fallacies that Whorf sees in natural 
logic. First, language is a part of the background and not the 
“critical consciousness”10 of the speaker, and is therefore 
like the color blue in the example. When we talk about logic, 
we naturally use concepts, grammar, and rules from our own 
language. We do not question these laws because we have 
not consciously compared them to any others. Second, 
discussions of natural logic normally occur between 
speakers of the same language. “Two speakers of English,”  
                                                
6 Benjamin Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” Technology Review, 42 
(1940): 2. 
7 Ibid, 2. 
8 Ibid, 2-3. 
9 Ibid, 3. 
10 Ibid, 4. 
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Whorf explains, “quickly reach a point of assent about the 
subject matter of their speech; they agree about what their  
language refers to.”11 It is not necessary for them to 
understand the linguistic processes that occur beneath the 
surface in order to agree on the rules that they share by 
virtue of both being speakers of English. 
 Whorf believes that the linguist is in a privileged 
position to study these phenomena and to expand their “base 
of reference”12. It was the study of multiple languages and 
patterns that lead Whorf to look at a linguistic system as 
“not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but 
rather… a shaper of ideas” 13. We all live in the same world, 
but we “dissect nature along lines laid down by our native 
languages”14. This idea has many implications for the 
objectivism of modern science, because it implies that 
individuals are not free to come up with their own thoughts 
about the world, but that their thoughts are shaped by the 
linguistic world in which they live (5). This affects every 
speaker of a language and leaves no one impartial, though 
Whorf argues that the most impartial would be the linguist 
who was familiar with many different linguistic systems. 
Whorf uses examples from his study of the Hopi language to 
show that the worldviews in English and Hopi are very 
different. 
 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, developed through 
Whorf’s article and through subsequent publications and 
influenced by his advisor, Edward Sapir, is a two-fold 
argument. First, humans are only able to think about objects, 
processes, and conditions that have language associated with  
                                                
11 Ibid, 4. 
12 Ibid, 5. 




them, which is what Whorf is getting at with his thought 
experiment of people who only see the color blue. This is  
called linguistic determinism. The other part of the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, linguistic relativity, states that culture is 
largely determined by language, as evidence by the 
relationship between language and thought. Linguists and 
cultural anthropologists usually support a strong or weak 
interpretation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. It is generally 
regarded as having some truth, but it presents some 
difficulties, as it is hard to completely support or refute it. 
Still, it has been a highly influential theory, particularly in 
the field of anthropology where it was lead to the 
development of methods in field research that emphasize 
cognitive categories in the brain that are unique to a 
particular culture and can be discovered through language. 
 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in many ways 
revolutionized ways of thinking about language and 
categories, particularly for the social sciences. It has also 
been a very controversial idea. In recent years, research in 
the cognitive sciences has lead linguists, psychologists, and 
philosophers to explore the possibility of a universal 
language, implying that concepts and categories are shared 
cross-culturally. The argument that there is a universal 
language of thought, “mentalese,” that transcends different 
languages seems to be the antithesis of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, and there are some philosophers who 
vehemently argue against linguistic relativism based on this 
idea. I would like to explore the question of whether or not 
these two views about language and meaning are mutually 
opposed and irreconcilable.  I will now turn to Pinker to 








 In The Language Instinct, Pinker lays out a 
revolutionary way of looking at language as an evolutionary 
mechanism. Pinker begins with Chomsky’s observation that 
children develop complex grammars without formal 
instruction and grow up with the ability to interpret 
sentences that they have never heard before.15 Pinker and 
Chomsky would both agree that children are innately 
equipped with a Universal Grammar16 that allows them to 
apply complex syntactic patterns from the speech of their 
parents. Pinker says, “complex language is universal 
because children actually reinvent it, generation after 
generation.”17 “… A three-year-old,” he says, “…is a 
grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual 
arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and other staples of 
the semiotics curriculum.”18 
 According to Pinker, language is separate from what 
is commonly considered by anthropologists to be culturally 
learned behavior. In fact, Pinker argues that language is 
actually better explained in terms of evolution than in terms 
of culture. He says, “Language is no more a cultural 
invention than is upright posture.”19 Cultural anthropologists 
argue that language encodes cultural symbols and shapes the 
thoughts of an individual within a given cultural context. If 
language can be explained in terms of evolutionary  
                                                
15 Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York: W. Morrow and 
Co., 1994), 22. 
16 Ibid, 22. 
17 Ibid, 32. 
18 Ibid, 19. 
19 Ibid, 18. 
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behavior, as Pinker claims, then certain aspects of 
anthropological methodology are undermined.  
 Not only is language an evolutionary mechanism, but 
it is an evolutionary mechanism with a specific function: 
communication. Pinker argues, “Once you begin to look at 
language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness 
but as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it 
is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious 
shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not.20 
If language is supposed to communicate information 
that is contained within one’s thoughts, then it follows that 
learned language (such as English or Japanese) cannot shape 
our thoughts, but it is mentalese that shapes language. Pinker 
says that mentalese “has symbols for concepts, and 
arrangements of symbols that correspond to who did what to 
whom.”21 I should note that mentalese not only operates 
according to a Universal Grammar, but that Pinker extends 
this to lexicon as well. We are able to communicate because 
our thoughts operate under a universal arrangement of 
symbols that is encoded in the mind of every language 
learner. Since language is just the means to the end of 
communication, Pinker asks why would language be so 
subjective? 
 In his chapter “Mentalese,” Pinker argues against the 
linguistic relativism proposed by the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. He even goes so far as to say that linguistic 
relativity is an example of what he calls “conventional 
absurdity: a statement that goes against all common sense 
but that everyone believes because they dimly recall having 
heard it somewhere.”22 Obviously there are reasons to  
                                                
20 Ibid, 19. 
21 Ibid, 81. 
22 Ibid, 57. 
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critique Pinker’s unsympathetic portrayal of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, but first I would like to show why Pinker is so  
dismissive of this view. Pinker believes that people do not 
think in any particular language, but that they think in a 
“language of thought.” 
 Knowing a language, according to Pinker is 
“knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words 
and vice versa.”23 This is a radically different view from 
linguistic relativism in that it posits a stage in language 
acquisition and speech that is at a level of symbolism and 
has nothing to do with the categories specific to any one 
language or culture. Mentalese is simpler than some aspects 
of language and more complex than others. Pinker describes 
how language is ambiguous, for example in newspaper 
headlines, but we are still able to interpret the correct 
meaning.24 For example, in the headline “Drunk Gets Nine 
Months in Violin Case,”25 most readers would understand 
that the word “case” does not refer to the case in which one 
keeps a violin. This illustrates one of the differences 
between mentalese and language; in English, “case” can 
have multiple meanings, whereas in mentalese, each 
meaning will constitute a different symbol. 
 Overall, Pinker presents some important challenges 
to linguistic relativism. He questions how relativism can 
account for our ability to translate one learned language into 
another, for the universality of language acquisition, and for 
the connection between language and biological universals 
that he observes through viewing language as an 
evolutionary mechanism . I find his arguments about 
mentalese to be convincing. Pinker argues that children have  
                                                
23 Ibid, 81. 
24 Ibid, 80-81. 
25 Ibid, 79. 
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their own mentalese that allows for them to acquire 
increasingly complicated language and eventually develop  
more advanced mentalese as well. This is necessary, Pinker 
says, for language acquisition. How can linguistic relativism 
account for the fact that we are thinking about the world 
before we learn a language and during the learning process? 
How can children connect language with thought and 
meaning if thoughts are completely shaped by language? 
These are very real worries for linguistic relativism, at any 
level of moderation. By extension, they should be a concern 
for any field in which linguistic relativism is important, such 
as anthropology.    
 In the last chapter “Mind Design” Pinker discusses 
some philosophical implications of the universality of the 
language instinct and his theory of mentalese. It is clear that 
he is completely opposed to anything resembling the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, because this goes against the goal of 
further researching biological and evolutionary universals 
about human nature and the mind that have been discovered. 
Pinker quotes philosopher and experimental psycholinguist 
Jerry Fodor, “I hate relativism,” he says at one point, “I hate 
relativism more than I hate anything else.”26 I believe that it 
is a mistake for Pinker to dismiss this viewpoint so 
vehemently. Does this merely illustrate that there is a 
polarizing divide in the philosophical community over 
language and thought? Is there any room for reconciling the 
two viewpoints, or of moderating them?  
 I will now turn to Wittgenstein and his relationship 
to anthropology to present a more nuanced view of cultural 
relativism. Though my defense of relativism could be  
 
                                                
26 Ibid, 405. 
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applied more generally, I believe that the Wittgensteinian 
view is especially useful in that it can accommodate a  
certain naturalism or empiricism that not all forms of 
relativism can contain. 
 
Wittgenstein and Anthropology 
 
Primarily a philosopher of language, mathematics, 
and logic, Wittgenstein was both influenced by and 
influenced anthropology. For example, it was negative 
reaction to Frazer’s Golden Bough that led Wittenstein to 
reexamine his views about culture and language. 
Wittgenstein finds Frazer’s explanation of magic and 
religion as “mistakes” to be highly unsatisfactory. In his 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough27, we can discern the 
outlines of his later views as presented in the Philosophical 
Investigations28. In general, Wittgenstein is critical of Frazer 
for judging the behavior of people in other cultures by his 
own societal standards. He says, “It never does seem 
plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity.”29 
Wittgenstein is particularly critical of Frazer for 
saying that magic and ritual are merely “false physics”30. He 
says, “What makes the character of ritual action is not any 
view or opinion, either right or wrong, although an opinion –  
 
                                                
27 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” (Trans. 
A.C. Miles.  
Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 2. 
28 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1958). 
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” (Trans. 
A.C. Miles.  Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 1. 
30 Ibid, 7. 
  16 
 
a belief – itself can be ritualistic, or belong to a rite.”31 
Wittgenstein compares the rituals that Frazer describes with 
rituals that he sees in his own culture; for example, breaking 
a bottle on a boat before sailing for good luck32. In 
comparing the rituals of one culture to those of his own, 
Wittgenstein shows that we within the multiplicity of 
language games in our own culture, we can see parallels 
across cultures. It would be inaccurate to equate the 
magician in one culture with the scientist in our own. It is 
more accurate to draw a parallel between a magician and a 
priest, or between two different folk beliefs.  Wittgenstein 
says about studying other cultures, “We can only describe 
and say human life is like that,”33 implying that we should 
not attempt to look for explanations. However, he seems 
open to the idea that we can use language games with which 
we are familiar in order to understand similar language 
games in other cultures. This puts him in an interesting 
position of arguing against explanation, but with some 
openness to the possibility of understanding. 
 In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein further 
develops this idea of language and behavior, which will 
influence anthropologists in the future. He famously 
compares a language system with a game.34 Wittgenstein 
argues that the rules of a “language game” are learned 
through practice, rather than seeking meaning through a 
comparison with some non-linguistic reality, and people 
follow different linguistic rules depending on what language 
game they are participating in at the time. When  
                                                
31 Ibid, 7. 
32 Ibid, 17. 
33 Ibid, 3. 
34 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1958), para. 85. 
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Wittgenstein says that it is a mistake to compare the magic 
of culture to the science of another, he seems to be equating 
a language game with the linguistic aspect of a culture. He  
says, “What we have in ancient rites is the practice of a 
highly cultivated gesture-game.”35 Wittgenstein does not 
ignore the possibility of biological commonalities between 
people, as we can see in his arguments about pain and 
crying, nor does he deny the instinctual ability of humans to 
acquire language. The very ability to distinguish between the 
discourse of magic and science implies that there must be 
aspects of both in our own culture. In trying to describe any 
universality and give it meaning, however, we run into a 
problem: It is impossible to give something value, meaning, 
or truth outside of a given system or language game. 
 Stanley Cavell, who writes about Wittgenstein as a 
philosopher of culture, focuses on Wittgenstein’s idea of 
forms of life. Cavell suggests that in applying Wittgenstein 
as a philosopher of culture, we distinguish between an 
ethnological or horizontal form of life and a vertical or 
“biological sense”.36 The “ethnological” form of life is 
related to our interaction in a cultural context, through words 
and other behavior, as participants in language games. The 
“biological sense” of forms of life relates to universal non-
linguistic aspects of life, including our naturally given 
behavior and responses. The two senses of forms of life that 
Cavell posits are, of course, connected. Wittgenstein’s 
concept of pain includes the natural behaviors related to 
crying. Though perhaps Wittgenstein himself would not talk  
                                                
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” (Trans. 
A.C. Miles. Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 10. 
36 Cavell Stanley. “Declining decline: Wittgenstein as a philosopher of 
culture.” This New  Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After 
Emerson After Wittgenstein (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1989), 42. 
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about these two separately, I have relied on Cavell’s 
distinction for this paper in order to emphasize that 
Wittgenstein posits a view that accounts for both universal,  
natural aspects of human life as well as subjective 
interpretations of this form of life through the shared 
language games in which we participate.  
 Anthropologist Veena Das points out that given the 
“certain air of obviousness with which notions of the 
everyday and voice are often spoken of in anthropological 
writing, I have been amazed at how difficult I found it to 
speak of these matters.”37 Das relates this idea of finding 
meaning in the everyday with Wittgenstein’s skepticism. 
Though Das does not endorse objectivity, her skepticism of 
the everyday and her awareness of the self-imposed 
boundaries of context and subjectivity offer a point from 
which to look closely at the world around her from a 
perspective that, if not objective, is grounded in something 
natural – the boundaries of being a subjective agent. 
 In studying a culture that has been affected by 
extreme and sudden violence and pain, Das observes a 
breakdown in the relationship between the forms of life 
surrounding her and the language game in which they 
previously were engaged in. She herself, like most of us, has 
not participated in these forms of life and a new language 
must be developed to speak of this. Because of the 
inextricable connection between pain and language, it is 
impossible for Das as an anthropologists to fully understand 
what her informants have experienced. However, it is 
through this lack of understanding that she finds a point 
from which to study. The point from which Das studies is  
                                                
37 Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the 
Ordinary (Berkley: Univ. Calif. Press, 2007), 4. 
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completely different from the perspective of someone like 
Pinker, who studies objective symbolic categories. Das does 
not attempt to study at that level of analysis; instead, she  
acknowledges her inability to explain the behavior of others, 
and settles for a limited understanding.  
 I plan to come to the defense of the Wittgensteinian 
perspective as it manifests itself in anthropology, 
specifically through the work of Veena Das and Stanley 
Cavell. Although Wittgenstein is sometimes dismissed by 
linguists on the grounds that he writes before the 
Chomskyan revolution, Das has taken Wittgenstein’s ideas 
and applied them to her current work. Her book Life and 
Words38 details her theories and methods, as well as some 
ethnographic chapters, that uses Wittgenstein’s ideas about 
language, pain, and privacy. It seems that Wittgenstein’s 





 In the previous section, I have outline Wittgenstein 
as a philosopher of culture and shown that he is a relativist 
with naturalist leanings. Wittgenstein’s cultural relativism, it 
seems, can still account for biological commonalities. In 
fact, even the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which is often taken 
as an extremely relativist position, does not have to deny the 
existence of a natural world independent of human 
discourse. In “Science and Linguisics,” Whorf says, “We all 
live in the same world, but we “dissect nature along lines  
 
 




laid down by our native languages.”39 I assume that in 
“nature,” Whorf would include the biological aspect of the 
“human animal,” thereby accounting for biological 
commonalities. 
 I have shown that it is possible to account for some 
biological commonality in relativism. However, Pinker 
would not want to stop there. The crucial difference between 
Pinker’s views and the Standard Social Science Model is 
not, as Pinker believes, that the SSSM is incompatible with 
biological commonalities, or that it denies the existence of a 
natural world outside of human discourse. Pinker takes the 
discovery of biological commonalities in cognition a step 
further to say that, not only are the material workings of our 
minds universal, but our actual meanings and values are 
universal. I see no evidence for this. 
 Pinker argues that language is an evolutionary 
mechanism that humans developed in order to communicate. 
Pinker does not see, however, that evolutionary mechanisms 
are valueless. In order to extend his argument that language 
is universal to other aspects of human behavior, Pinker 
provides an exhaustive list, borrowed from Donald Brown in 
Human Universals, that people have in common cross-
culturally. On the list are such abstract concepts as “law,” 
“rights”, and “property,” as well as practices such as 
“institutionalized marriage.” Just as every attempt to recreate 
mentalese has resembled the language of the creator, this list 
contains words that have connotations unique to Western 
culture, perhaps even the culture of the US. The very idea of 
“rights” is extremely difficult to communicate cross- 
 
                                                




culturally, presumably because this word as loaded with 
values and meanings that could not possibly be universal.  
 Relativism in a Wittgensteinian sense is not at all 
incompatible with the cognitivist project of discovering the 
inner workings of the human mind. Suppose that we did in 
fact discover a “language of thought” and tested it cross- 
culturally, proving that everyone in the world thinks with a 
Universal Grammar. What about this “language” makes it a 
language in any way that is comparable to how we normally 
view language? Wittgenstein argues that we can only 
interpret an utterance as a language if we can also interpret 
the speaker’s overall behavior. This is how Wittgenstein 
arrives at his famous line, “If a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him”40. Veena Das suggests that it is possible to 
relate to people in ways that appeal to different levels of 
understanding besides the surface meaning of a given 
language game, without appealing to some transcendental 
universal grammar that resides in each of us. We might also 
ask the question, if we have a universal grammar, why do 
we not understand each other better? We do not, after all, 
understand the innermost thoughts and motivations of even 
fellow participants in our most practiced language games. 
 This brings me to the next defense of a 
Wittgensteinian view of relativism. Pinker posits that 
language evolved for the specific purpose of 
communication. Again, if this is the purpose of language, 
why can we not communicate better than we do? Das talks 
about what she considers the difference between speech and 
voice. Speech, or utterance, is not all there is to language. In 
dealing with world-shattering violence, Das explains that 
people lose context to the point where the language game in  
                                                
40 PI II.xi.218 
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which they operate no longer corresponds to the everyday 
reality in which they live. People then seek to recover this 
reality through everyday events and conversation, but as Das 
finds in her fieldwork, the speech, or words uttered, do not 
always correspond to the voice of her informants. Das finds 
just as much meaning in silences, secrets, and omissions, as  
she does in the language of her informants. These can find a 
place in Wittgenstein’s language game, but not in Pinker’s 
mentalese. 
 Not only is language not always effective for 
communication, but why should we give primacy to 
communication as the purpose of language? Pinker seems to 
posit a value on language that does not implicitly exist in all 
linguistic behavior. People learn to play games, tell jokes, 
and write meaningless poetry. What, evolutionarily, would 
motivate us to communicate in such ways? If direct 
communication is the purpose of language, then why do we 
not all speak in Aristotelian syllogisms? Whatever goes on 
in the inner workings of our brains when we speak does not 
seem to be directly related to the purpose of our linguistic 
behavior in practice. 
 This linguistic behavior is related to the larger 
cultural context of human behavior in a way that Pinker does 
not fully address. When Pinker says, “Language is no more a 
cultural invention than is upright posture” (18), he 
unwittingly leaves the connection of language to other 
learned behaviors open. Upright posture is not learned 
through cultural immersion, but the meaning of sitting 
upright at the dinner table is definitely a cultural symbol.  As 
humans, why should we necessarily separate the two – 
evolution and culture – in our minds? Pinker describes a 
practice in one culture of building sand around infants in 
order to teach them to sit up straight. Clearly, in this culture,  
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people do not make a distinction between what is natural and 
what is culture; neither is given primacy. In our culture, we 
see the same principle at work in Chomsky’s discussion of 
the prevalence of motherese. It is precisely because 
evolutionary behaviors are learned along with cultural 
behaviors that different cultural behaviors exist. 
 Language is no different from these other behaviors 
in the sense that it is both innate and learned culturally. 
Pinker says “Complex language is universal because 
children actually reinvent it, generation after generation.”41 
The evolutionary mechanism that allows children to 
“reinvent” language is not incompatible but works alongside 
the cultural behavior that surrounds language learning. As 
children learn language, cultural symbols are encoded in a 
way that is also biological. These symbols have causal 
efficacy in the choices that people make because they 
govern their worldview. This worldview is not something 
that can be reduced to a universal grammar. The collective 
worldview, which acts in relation to the abstract rules that 
are applied in order to learn a language, is an essential 
component to understanding language. It governs both the 
subjects and the researcher who studies language and 
culture. Perhaps this is why the only attempts at recreating 
mentalese have resembled the language of the researcher. 
 For example, we cannot directly relate understanding 
to a state of mind or an abstract principle. Instead, 
understanding how to go on with a numerical series is 
demonstrated in the ability that we show to continue 
correctly with the series. In this argument, Wittgenstein 
seeks to refute a Cartesian idea that the understanding is  
                                                
41 Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York: W. Morrow and 
Co., 1994), 32. 
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hidden away in the privacy of the individual mind, not a 
modern idea about the cognitive nature of the mind. 
However, it can be applied to Pinker’s idea of mentalese. I 
do not think that Wittgenstein would reject the attempts that 
cognitive scientists make to study the mind, but would resist  
any attempt to equate the meaning of terms like 
“understand’ with brain states rather than human practices. 
 Knowing a language, according to Pinker is 
“knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words 
and vice versa”42. This is precisely where he departs from 
Wittgenstein. I do not know mentalese, and I don’t know 
anyone who does. There may be underlying mental 
processes associated with everything from witty banter to 
abstract concepts, but that does not mean that these mental 
processes are these concepts. Wittgenstein studies language 
as a part of the behavior of humans. When Wittgenstein 
suggested the impossibility of opening the black box of the 
human mind, he was referring primarily to the Cartesian 
mind. This could also be applied to the present-day research 
in cognitive science and the study of the biological processes 
associated with language. Even if we did discover a 
language of thought, this would not be a language that any 
of us know, and it would not correspond to the subjective 
way each of us sees the world. It would also not undermine 
the assertion that the way one behaves in the world is 






                                                




 When Pinker says, “Language is no more a cultural 
invention than is upright posture”43, he is referring to only 
one aspect of language and behavior. Upright posture, in the 
sense of humans walking upright rather than crawling on all 
fours, is not cultural. However, the meaning that we give to 
upright posture is. The fact that that very phrase evokes for  
me the image of a strict parent instructing a child to sit up 
straight at the dinner table is a cultural fact, not an 
evolutionary fact. Language may be an evolutionary 
mechanism and, of course, biological commonalities in 
humans limit the scope of cultural diversity. However, we 
are equally limited by the linguistic system in which we 
operate because we do not consciously think in mentalese; 
we think in the linguistic system in which we were raised. 
We can point out biological commonalities, but we will 
always be limited in our communication of these 
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